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Regulation, Bank Competitiveness,
and Episodes of Missing Money
I
n setting monetary policy, most central banks
look at a number of economic indicators, includ-
ing data on monetary aggregates. The motivation
for monitoring monetary aggregates comes from
the equation of exchange:
() , 1 MV PY ×=×
where M = money, V = velocity [nominal gross
domestic product (GDP) / M )], P = the price level,
and Y = transactions (usually measured by inflation-
adjusted GDP). Typically, people reduce their
holdings of money as the spread between a risk-
less short-term market interest rate (such as the
three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate) and the average
yield earned on monetary assets rises. As a result,
the velocity of money rises as this spread or
“opportunity cost” of money increases. If velocity is
predictable, then money and its predicted velocity
can be used to infer nominal GDP (P × Y ). Under
these circumstances, a monetary aggregate is useful
for policymakers as an indicator of nominal GDP.
This is especially true because data on GDP are
available after a long lag, whereas information on
money and interest rates is more readily available.
However, in three of the past four recessions
(1973–74, 1979–80, and 1990–91), the monetary
aggregate most closely monitored by the Federal
Reserve has been much weaker relative to income
and opportunity cost measures than previous
experience predicted. This unusual weakness, or
“missing money,”1 poses a serious problem for
policymakers because it means that the monetary
aggregate in question is less useful as an indicator
of nominal activity at a critical point in the business
cycle. Furthermore, analysts often need at least
several quarters of data to discern whether such a
money demand shock has occurred and whether
any particular shock is permanent or temporary.
Consider a permanent downward shift in the
level of demand for a monetary aggregate; such a
shift would result in a fall of that aggregate’s growth
rate relative to GDP growth over a period of time
at each level of opportunity cost. There are two
choices that a responsible central bank would
consider. If the central bank stabilized the growth
rate of that aggregate at the previous average,
nominal GDP growth would temporarily accelerate
and then return to its previous growth rate. Even-
tually, the spurt in nominal GDP growth would
result in a temporary acceleration in inflation. As
a result, the price level would be permanently
raised relative to its path had the money demand
shock not occurred. While the price level would
post only a once-and-for-all rise, such an episode
would create uncertainty about whether the central
bank was committed to controlling inflation. Such
uncertainty would likely depress real economic
activity for awhile because inflation uncertainty
discourages firms and households from committing
to long-run projects.
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1 Throughout this study, the term “missing money” describes
episodes in which the level of a monetary aggregate has
been smaller than predicted based on past relationships,
income, and the opportunity cost of money.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2
As an alternative, the central bank may accept
temporary weakness in the growth of its primary
monetary aggregate. However, it is difficult in real
time to know precisely how much of a slowdown
is appropriate. If the central bank permitted money
growth to slow too much, nominal GDP growth
would temporarily be below trend. If the monetary
authority underestimated the impact of a money
demand shock, then nominal GDP growth would
temporarily be above trend until the money
demand shock passed.2
Given that cases of missing money are prob-
lematic for central banks, it is natural to ask why
there have been money demand shifts. To help
answer this question, this study reviews research on
the three most recent episodes of missing money.
Common to each of these cases is a decline in
banks’ ability to compete with nonbanks that
stemmed from the changing impact of banking
regulations. As a result of declines in the competi-
tiveness of banks, households and firms have
shifted toward using nonbank types of “money”
and credit, and researchers have found it helpful
to redefine money or measures of its opportunity
cost to obtain a more reliable indicator of nomi-
nal GDP.3
In establishing these findings, this study begins
with a simple macroeconomic model of how rising
bank regulatory taxes can contribute to weakness
in overall economic activity and a decline in the
share of credit provided by banks. The second
section of this article reviews the mechanics of how
a shift away from credit and deposits at banks to
substitutes at nonbanks can also result in a missing-
money phenomenon. Within this framework, the
second section then analyzes evidence on the
three most recent episodes of missing money.
Each case of missing money is found to have
coincided with declines in the ability of banks to
compete with nonbanks. The concluding section
discusses the policy implications of these findings.
A simple macroeconomic model
This section lays out a simple model of aggre-
gate demand that can be used to analyze the
impact of regulatory burden on economic activity
and on the share of credit provided by banks.
These effects, coupled with insights provided in
the next section, are later shown to be useful in
helping policymakers detect whether a monetary
aggregate is accurately reflecting nominal GDP
growth. The model used here is presented in two
parts. First, the conditions for equilibrium in the
goods market are described in a world where firms
can borrow either from banks or directly from
open credit markets. Second, conditions for equi-
librium in the credit market are derived. Using
these conditions, the equilibrium levels of output
and interest rates are derived.
A simple IS specification. A portion of firms
(Θm) obtains credit only from the financial markets,
while the remaining portion (Θb ≡ 1–Θm) relies
completely on bank loans. Demand by each firm
for open market (Lm) or bank credit (Lb) is
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where Greek letters denote positive coefficients,
Y is output, Rm is the average rate on open market
credit, and R b is the average bank loan rate.
The average cost of credit (R) and total pri-
vate credit demand (Lp) across all firms are thus
























2 The cases in the text analyze permanent shocks to money
demand. If the shocks were temporary, then by not altering
its long-run monetary targets, a central bank could keep the
economy growing in line with the central bank’s previous
long-run nominal GDP target. In this case, there would be
some temporary acceleration or deceleration in nominal
GDP growth that would later be reversed.
3 As argued later in this article, money demand shifts in the
mid- and late-1970s led the Federal Reserve to change the
primary monetary aggregate it monitored from M1 to M2.
Indeed, when M2 was officially created in 1980, it was
defined to include new financial instruments such as money
market mutual funds (MMMFs) and repurchase agree-
ments.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 3
On grounds that firms and households spend less
when the cost of finance rises, nominal income is




















Decisions about modeling how the costs of
bank and open market credit are determined have
been made to be consistent with several key stylistic
facts. First, firms that rely on open market credit
generally are perceived as posing little default risk.
Second, bank credit has an advantage over open
market paper in that the deposit insurance system
bears some of the default risk of bank loans. Third,
open market credit has an advantage over bank
credit in avoiding certain regulatory costs imposed
on the banking system.
Interest rates on bank and open market
credit are, respectively:
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where r is the riskless market interest rate, d is the
implicit default risk subsidy on bank loans from
deposit insurance, Db is the average fair market
risk premium on bank loans, Dm is the average
fair market risk premium on open market paper,
t bf reflects any regulatory burdens on banks that
effectively can be treated as a constant, cb is a
constant reflecting the per-dollar costs of providing
bank loans not associated with interest costs or
default risk (primarily information and transactions
costs), and cm is a constant reflecting the per-dollar
information and transactions costs associated with
issuing open market paper.
To capture differences in default risk across
firms in a tractable way, the assumption has been
made that the fair market default risk premium
(Di) across firm types (i) has a uniform distribu-
tion over the interval:4
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Setting equations 7 and 8 equal yields the critical
level of default risk (D c) at which firms are indif-
ferent between bank and open market credit:




















which is increasing in regulatory taxes imposed
on all bank loans (tbf ), decreasing in the extent to
which bank loans have lower information and
transactions costs than open market paper (cb – cm),
and decreasing in the implicit risk-taking subsidy
(d ) provided by deposit insurance. Since Di has
a uniform distribution over [0,1], Θm = Dc and
Θb = 1 – Dc. In this model, banks lend to higher
risk firms, while lower risk firms issue open market
paper. The reason is that the cost disadvantage of
bank regulatory taxes is roughly fixed across borrow-
ers, while the implicit benefit of deposit insurance
is increasing in default risk because indirectly tax-
payers bear some of the risk.5 For example, the
implicit benefit of deposit insurance is low on a
bank loan to a firm that has low default risk, while
the regulatory burden of such a loan may be very
high. In this case, bank loans are a more costly
source of credit than open market paper. Thus, the
model is consistent with the stylized fact that only
very low default risk firms issue commercial paper.
This qualitative result can be obtained in this model
if one assumes that the information costs of issuing
open market debt are lower for firms having low
default risk because their creditworthiness is
generally more transparent to investors.6
Since default risk is distributed uniformly, the
average default risk premium on open market paper
is (Dc/2) and that on bank loans is ([1 + Dc]/2).
Using these average risk premia along with
4 For ease of exposition, any rationing of credit is sup-
pressed.
5 As stressed by Keeley (1990), the value of this implicit
subsidy depends on how well-capitalized a bank is. This
implicit subsidy declines as a bank’s capital increases
because when a bank fails, the capital invested by bank
equity and subordinated debt holders are the first funds
used to cover any losses from liquidating the bank. For ease
of exposition, all banks are treated as being equally capital-
ized in the model.
6 Diamond (1991) develops a theoretical model that more
rigorously and formally demonstrates this result.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 4
equations 7, 8, and 10 yields the following expres-
















































































































































Equation 12 implies that the average cost of
credit rises when either bank regulatory taxes (t bf )
or information and transactions costs (cb) increase.
This result is obtained because the rise in credit
costs to those firms that remain bank borrowers
will outweigh the effect of some firms’ switching
toward less expensive open market paper. Thus, a
rise in regulatory taxes might help induce a reces-
sion, cause a decline in the importance of banks
in credit markets, and—as will be discussed in the
next section—trigger an episode of missing money.
As equation 12 also indicates, a rise in the
information and transactions costs of commercial
paper (cb) will cause the average cost of credit to
increase. This increase occurs even though some
firms shift away from open market paper when
the information and transactions costs of open
market paper rise because the effects of this shift
on average credit costs are outweighed by the
impact of higher costs on those that remain non-
bank borrowers. Thus, a rise in cm will, by raising
the cost of open market paper, cause banks to
gain credit market share and reduce the demand
for nominal output.
A rise in the deposit insurance subsidy de-
creases the average cost of credit by lowering the
cost of bank loans. While the sign of the effect is
theoretically ambiguous, a higher subsidy will
lower the cost of finance as long as there are some
firms that rely on bank loans (that is, Θ m < 1).
Substituting equation 11 into equation 6 yields












































































































which implies a negative relationship between
combinations of output and the short-term interest
rate that clear the goods market. Thus, the IS
curve has the normal downward-sloping shape
(Figure 1). As will be shown later, equation 13
implies that a rise in regulatory taxes on banks
reduces output at each combination of the riskless
market interest rate (r) and goods demand (Y).
Figure 1
Effect of a Rise in Bank Regulatory Burden




    Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 5
Thus, such an increase in bank regulatory burden
can be depicted as an inward shift of the IS curve
from IS0 to IS1. Of course, a rise in regulatory
taxes may indirectly affect rt when the conditions
for goods market equilibrium (IS curve) and credit
market equilibrium are solved together.
Credit market equilibrium conditions. Tradi-
tional Keynesian models depict interest rates as
determined by the supply and demand for money.
This approach may have been plausible for the
1930s and 1940s because few firms could issue
open market paper following the collapse of the
bond and commercial paper markets during the
Great Depression. Today, it is more accurate to
model short-term interest rates as determined by
the total supply and demand for short-term credit,
since commercial paper and Treasury bills have
each grown to roughly the size of commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans at banks.7
The demand for short-term credit is mainly
comprised of the demand for bank loans, commer-
cial paper, and Treasury bills. Although it is likely
that the demand for bank loans and commercial
paper is interest-sensitive, it can be argued that
the demand by the U.S. government for Treasury
bills has generally been highly insensitive to short-
term rates. By implication, government demand
for short-term credit can be approximated by a
constant (Lg), and total credit demand (Lt) equals
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In principle, the supply of short-term credit
can be depicted as the sum of credit supplies from
different sources. However, the supply of short-
term credit in the United States can be depicted in
a simple fashion because the Federal Reserve has
typically implemented monetary policy by altering
a targeted level of the federal funds rate to stabilize
nominal aggregate activity. Federal funds are
reserves that banks trade with one another to meet
reserve requirements on bank deposits. By pur-
chasing or selling reserves in exchange for Treasury
bills, the Federal Reserve tries to target a chosen
level for the federal funds rate. Under these con-
ditions, banks would borrow from the Federal
Reserve to purchase T-bills if T-bill rates were
above the average expected level of the federal
funds rate over the remaining maturity of the
Treasury bills. Banks will continue to buy Treasury
bills until T-bill rates fall in line with expectations
of the federal funds rate, consistent with the em-
pirical findings of Cook and Hahn (1989). This
arbitrage implies that the T-bill rate equals the
average federal funds rate target (r e) that the
market expects the Federal Reserve to use over
the life of a particular maturity T-bill. By implica-
tion, the Federal Reserve can generally target short-
term interest rates, and the supply curve of total
short-term credit (Ls) is horizontal (Figure 2) and
Figure 2
The Supply of and Demand for Short-Term Credit
r,re
y,L





7 For example, the outstanding commercial paper of non-
financial and financial firms is roughly four-fifths the size of
C&I loans at banks (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1993), while
the stock of U.S. Treasury bills is roughly as large as C&I
loans at banks.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 6
depends on the expected path of the federal
funds rate target.8
As output rises at a given level of interest
rates, the credit demand curve shifts to the right.
However, if the Federal Reserve maintains its funds
rate target, the credit supply curve remains horizon-
tal and the riskless short-term interest rate does
not change. As a result, the equilibrium combina-
tions of interest rates and output at which short-
term credit demand equals short-term credit supply
can be depicted as the horizontal CC curve in
Figure 3. This curve shifts in line with expectations
about the federal funds rate target. The result that
the CC curve is horizontal under an interest rate
target parallels the flat LM curve obtained in Poole’s
(1970) model.9
The effects of altering the relative cost of
bank loans and open market paper. According
to equation 10, three types of factors affect the
relative use of bank loans and open market paper:
bank regulatory taxes (t bf ), the implicit deposit
insurance subsidy (d ), and the differential between
the information costs for bank loans and for open
market paper (cb – cm). In light of these three
factors and the forthcoming analysis of three cases
of missing money, this section presents analysis
of the effects of a rise in bank regulatory taxes, a
decline in the implicit deposit insurance subsidy,
and a decline in information costs associated with
open market paper.
The effects of raising bank regulatory taxes.
By increasing the cost of loans relative to market
interest rates, a rise in bank regulatory taxes shifts
the IS curve inward to IS1. This can be demon-
strated by differentiating equation 13 and substi-
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If the central bank does not perceive the IS shift
and cuts interest rates, then smoothing short-term
market interest rates (r e) results in a decline in the
demand for nominal output (Y ) from Y0 to Y1. As
a consequence, increases in bank regulatory taxes
can contribute to the onset of a recession.10
Changes in bank regulatory taxes thus create
disturbances to the IS curve, which create problems
in using a federal funds rate target. This result
accords with the insights in Poole (1970). Poole’s
Figure 3








    
y1
    
8 By contrast, the Federal Reserve has much less effect on
long-term interest rates, which it indirectly affects by influ-
encing expectations about future inflation and the size of the
inflation risk premium in long-term interest rates. This pre-
mium reimburses investors for the risk that inflation may be
higher than they expect. If inflation were higher than ex-
pected, expectations of future inflation would likely rise,
then interest rates would rise so that inflation-adjusted
yields are maintained. These conditions imply that bond
prices would likely fall.
9 A flat CC curve is a reasonable approximation in the very
short run. However, any changes in the central bank’s
target rate that are made partly on the basis of money or
credit growth imply that this curve is upward-sloping in
the medium run. Thus, past changes in the federal funds
rate target that have been partly or largely based on M2
growth suggest that the CC (or LM) curve has an upward
slope in the short to medium run.
10 In the short run, a rise in bank regulatory taxes causes a
rise in the average cost of credit. If, however, enough inno-
vation is induced by regulations, the average cost of credit
could fall in the long run, provided the long-run cost of
issuing open market paper declines enough. For example,
while the regulatory burden of reserve requirements likely
increased the cost of providing bank loans in the high
interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
it helped spur the development of the commercial paper
market. As pointed out by Post (1992), the cost of commer-
cial paper has generally fallen over the past decade.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 7
model showed that a central bank policy of tar-
geting a monetary aggregate will be superior to
that of targeting a short-term interest rate if IS
shocks are large relative to money demand shocks.
It is thus tempting to conclude that targeting a
monetary aggregate would yield superior results
under these circumstances.
However, as shown in the next section, the
change in banks’ regulatory burden also causes a
fall in the demand for money. In the Poole frame-
work, as the importance of money demand dis-
turbances rises, targeting a monetary aggregate
becomes less attractive relative to targeting a short-
term interest rate. Thus, changes in banks’ regula-
tory burden create problems for both types of
operating procedures.
The effects of reducing the implicit deposit
insurance subsidy. The effects of reducing the
implicit deposit insurance subsidy are qualitatively
similar to those of increasing the regulatory tax on
banks. Such a decline increases the cost to banks
of providing loans (equation 7), which makes bank
loans relatively more expensive than open market
paper for more firms. One result of this change in
relative costs is that some firms shift away from
bank loans and switch to issuing open market
paper (Θm increases in equation 10). In addition,
much like a rise in bank regulatory taxes, a reduc-
tion in this subsidy (d ) leads to an increase in the
average cost of finance (R in equation 12). This
increase in cost, in turn, shifts the IS curve inward,
thereby reducing the nominal demand for goods





































This expression is positive because ( R/ d ) < 0
and implies that reducing d will shift the IS curve
inward.
For two reasons, one should avoid inferring
from this example that reductions in the implicit
deposit insurance subsidy are not necessarily bene-
ficial. First, any effect on aggregate demand can be
offset by a monetary easing action, which would
push down short-term market interest rates. Second,
because deposit insurance implicitly shifts much
of the default risk on high-risk loans from stock-
holders in banks and thrifts to taxpayers, deposit
insurance results in excessively risky lending and
thus creates inefficiencies. The high cost of the
savings and loan association bailout provides a
justification for implementing risk-based capital
standards. The point of this example is to illus-
trate that monetary policy should take into
account any macroeconomic impact of curtailing
the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance.
The effects of a decline in the information
costs of open market paper. A decline in the
information costs of open market paper can stem
from reductions in costs associated with investors’
learning about firms, improved computer technol-
ogy that reduces the transactions costs of buying
and selling open market paper (such as bonds and
commercial paper), and the deepening or increased
liquidity of open paper markets. Like a decline
in the deposit insurance subsidy to banks and a
rise in bank regulatory taxes, a fall in the costs of
providing open market paper (cm) will reduce the
cost of open market paper (R m) relative to that of
bank loans (Rb) and thereby induce a rise in the
share of open market paper (Θm in equation 10).
The effects on aggregate demand, however,
differ greatly because a decline in the cost of open
market paper lowers the average cost of finance
(equation 11). As a result, the gap between the
average cost of finance to firms and the riskless
open market rate paid by the U.S. Treasury narrows
at each level of income. Thus, a decline in cm
causes the IS schedule to shift to the right, thereby
driving up aggregate nominal demand. This effect
can be demonstrated by differentiating equation






























The stabilization of aggregate demand thus calls
for increasing the federal funds rate, in contrast to
the prescription of cutting the federal funds rate if
bank regulatory taxes rise or if the deposit insur-
ance subsidy is lowered.
Thus, the monetary policy implications of
these examples are not the same. The analysis
above implies that to discern among these types ofFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas 8
shocks, policymakers should check for not only a
decline in bank credit market share, but also for
whether such a decline is accompanied by a rising
regulatory burden on banks, a reduction in the
implicit deposit insurance subsidy to banks, and a
weakening in income growth or, alternatively, a
reduction in the information and transactions costs
of using open market paper and a strengthening
of nominal income growth. The next section
discusses how an unpredictable decline in the
measured money supply may also accompany
such shocks.
Episodes of money demand instability
This section begins by describing how, in a
simple framework, reduced bank competitiveness
can lead to a missing-money phenomenon. Then,
in terms of this framework, three episodes of miss-
ing money are discussed: the missing M1A in the
mid-1970s, the missing M1A and surge in money
market mutual funds (MMMFs) during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and the current case of the miss-
ing M2. Finally, the implications of these shocks
for M2 targeting are discussed.
How reduced bank competitiveness can create
a missing-money phenomenon. This section out-
lines a simple supply and demand model of money
that can be used to analyze cases of missing money.
In Figure 4, the money demand (Md) curve is drawn
with a downward slope that reflects that house-
holds and firms reduce their holdings of money as
the opportunity cost of money (OC ) rises (if all else
remains the same). The opportunity cost of money
is the extra yield that investors forgo by holding
money, which provides convenience and transac-
tions services over other assets that have higher
pecuniary yields. In practice, opportunity costs are
typically measured as the difference between a
riskless short-term market interest rate and the
average yield earned on monetary assets. The money
demand curve is drawn for a given level of income.
This curve shifts to the right as income rises be-
cause the transactions demand for money will rise
at each level of the opportunity cost of money.
The money supply curve (M s) has an upward
slope to reflect that banks would be willing to
supply more deposits as the spread between
market interest rates and deposit rates increases
because banks can earn more profit by supplying
deposits when the yields on securities (or loans)
rise relative to deposit rates. Here it is assumed
that the Federal Reserve does not rigidly target
money balances (otherwise, the money supply
schedule would be vertical).11 The money supply
schedule is partly a derived demand for funding
loans because banks will bid up deposit rates if
loan demand rises and loan interest rates rise as a
result. Thus, a monetary easing action that boosts
loan demand through interest rate or wealth effects
will shift this curve to the right, while an exoge-
nous decline in demand for bank loans will shift
the curve to the left.
Figure 4














11 This assumption is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s
use of a target range for M2. This policy allows M2 balances
to move within a range for three reasons. First, it implicitly
recognizes that moderate M2 growth will, barring money
demand shocks, need to accompany moderate growth in
nominal income. Second, this policy recognizes that changes
in interest rates will affect the velocity of M2 and thereby
alter the pace of M2 growth needed for moderate growth in
nominal income. Third, the policy also recognizes that shifts
in money demand may occur and that the money supply
curve may shift owing to bank behavior. In the latter case,
the opportunity cost of money associated with a particular
federal funds rate could vary, depending on how actively
banks bid for M2 deposits. This practice, in turn, alters the
velocity of M2 and the growth rate of M2 that is needed to
stabilize aggregate demand.
The case of a nonrange money target is discussed
later in this article.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 9
Money demand models, such as the Federal
Reserve Board’s M2 model (henceforth, the FRB
model ),12 tend to estimate M2 growth well as long
as changes in the level of income are the only
source of shifts in the money demand schedule.
The following examples illustrate this point. First,
consider what happens if the Federal Reserve eases
monetary policy. The easing shifts the money
supply schedule to the right in the short run, caus-
ing a decline in M2’s equilibrium opportunity cost.
This movement along the money demand curve is
picked up by the opportunity cost measures in
the FRB model. Then, as the decline in short-term
interest rates causes aggregate demand to pick
up, nominal income will rise, causing the money
demand schedule to shift to the right, which in-
duces a measured rise in M2’s opportunity costs.
This shift of the money demand curve is picked up
by the income and consumption spending variables
in the FRB model. In the past, M2’s growth rate
primarily reflected movements of the money supply
curve along the money demand curve and shifts
of the money demand curve owing to income
changes. As a result, the coefficient estimates of
the FRB model reflect a positive effect of income
on M2 growth and a negative correlation of M2’s
opportunity costs with M2 growth. By implication,
the coefficient estimates of the FRB model will
yield good predictions of M2 growth as long as
income and money supply shocks are the only
sources of change affecting M2.
An example of a money demand shock. Now
consider an example in which some changes in
the economic environment not reflected in M2’s
measured opportunity cost simultaneously cause
firms to shift from C&I loans to bonds and induce
households to shift out of M2 deposits into bond
mutual funds. Income is held constant in this
example to reduce the number of curve shifts for
ease of exposition.
This case is shown in Figure 5. One result is
that the demand for bank credit falls, and with it,
bank demand for issuing M2 deposits. By implica-
tion, the M2 supply curve shifts inward (shift 1),
and the FRB model should pick up this decline
through its opportunity cost measures. However,
because the demand for M2 deposits also falls at
every combination of OC and Y, the money demand
curve shifts inward (shift 2). Since coefficient esti-
mates for most M2 models are based on a past
negative correlation between M2 and its opportu-
nity cost, the money demand model implicitly
assumes that a shift in the money supply rather
than demand curve has occurred. In terms of
Figure 5, money demand models assume that the
demand curve is unchanged and that the supply
curve intersects the demand curve at point A. As
a result, money demand models would estimate,
once interest rate and income data are available,
that M2 moved to a level like M2′ rather than
having declined all the way to M2″.13 In this instance,
a case of missing money would occur.
Alternatively, if the demand curve shift is
large enough relative to the supply curve shift, then
OC could be lower in equilibrium and the money
demand model would predict a rise in M2 even
though M2 would actually fall (since both the Md
and M s curves shift to the left). In either case, the
money demand model overpredicts the equilib-
rium level of M2 because it fails to pick up the
money demand curve shift by assuming that only
Figure 5





















12 For a discussion of this model, see Moore, Porter, and Small
(1990) and Small and Porter (1989).
13 Note that income is being held constant in this example.
While changes in income will shift the Md curve, the inclusion
of income variables in money demand curves controls for
Md shifts stemming from changes in income.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 10
changes in nominal income shift the money
demand curve.14
Fundamentally, the money demand shift
occurs because both borrowers and depositors
substitute away from banks for credit and deposit
services. To illustrate this point, Figure 6 depicts
the transfers of funds in the movement to a lower
equilibrium level of M2. Suppose a firm issues a
$100 bond purchased with $100 by a bond mutual
fund, which in turn gives $100 in mutual fund
shares to a household in exchange for a $100 check
drawn on a bank account. Suppose also that the
household moved the $100 from a nonreservable
small time deposit to a checking account to make
the transaction.15 The firm takes the $100 raised by
issuing bonds (exchange a) to pay off $100 in C&I
loans to the bank (exchange d). The bond mutual
fund pays the firm with the $100 it raised from
selling mutual fund shares to households (exchange
b). The household, in turn, obtains the $100 used
to purchase bond fund shares by withdrawing
$100 from its bank checking account (exchange c).
In essence, the $100 that the household shifts into
bond funds eventually goes back to the bank
when the firm issuing bonds pays off its C&I loan.
Another way of showing this equilibrium is
to review each party’s balance sheet, as depicted
in Figure 7. On the firm’s balance sheet, total
liabilities are unchanged as the $100 increase in
bonds issued matches the $100 decline in C&I loans.
For the household, the $100 increase in bond fund
holdings matches the $100 decline in M2 balances.
Notice that total assets and total liabilities are un-
changed for the firm and household. The bond
fund, however, experiences a $100 increase in both
assets (the $100 rise in bonds) and liabilities (the
$100 increase in mutual fund shares). By contrast,
the banking industry is hit with a $100 decline in
C&I loans on the asset side that is matched by a
$100 decline in M2 deposits on the liability side. If
the only source of inflows into bond funds came
from M2 balances, then one way to solve this case
of missing money would be to add bond funds to
M2, much like adding MMMFs to M2, provided
that one or more variables could be found to con-
sistently measure the desire to hold bond funds.
This example illustrates how a case of missing
money can arise when M2’s demand curve shifts,













+100 bonds +100 mutual











   mutual









14 From a Marshallian point of view, money demand changes
predicted by typical econometric models can be inter-
preted as movements along short-run money demand
curves that may shift with income levels, whereas money
demand shocks can instead be interpreted as movements
along a long-term money demand curve in so far as these
“shocks” represent the endogenous response of firms and
households to changes in the opportunity cost of using
money.
15 This assumption enables us to avoid changing bank re-
serves and is sensible, given that bond funds seem to be
more substitutable for small time accounts than for other M2
balances that are less useful as savings vehicles.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 11
Thus, missing money likely can be accounted for by
unusual events that cause either possible changes
in the elasticity of money demand with respect to
income or opportunity costs, or permanent declines
in money demand for given levels of income and
opportunity cost measures.
The mid-1970s case of missing money. Until
the early 1980s, the monetary aggregate most
closely monitored by the Federal Reserve was
M1A, which was defined as currency plus demand
deposits.16 Based on its prior relationship to income
and interest rates, M1A was unusually weak in the
mid-1970s, leading one monetary economist to
call this episode “The Case of the Missing Money”
(Goldfeld 1976).
The mid-1970s were characterized by shocks
to both sides of bank balance sheets and by a
severe recession. On the asset side, there was
unusual weakness in C&I loans. Many large firms
shifted from C&I loans to commercial paper and
finance company loans for three reasons. First,
because market interest rates rose above deposit
rate ceilings set under Regulation Q, depositors
shifted funds away from banks and thrifts toward
investments bearing market interest rates (see the
box entitled “Regulation Q and the Competitiveness
of Banks and Thrifts”). Owing to a shortage of
loanable funds, banks and thrifts rationed credit
with nonprice terms, which drove larger firms to
credit sources that were unaffected by Regulation Q
(Figure 8).17 (Mortgage borrowers had fewer alter-
natives and as a result, there was a sharp decline
in housing construction [Jaffee and Rosen 1979
and Hendershott 1980]). Second, partly to free up
funds for other borrowers, some banks provided
lines of credit to back up commercial paper issuance
to encourage their largest borrowers to make this
shift.18 Third, the rise in short-term rates increased
the reserve requirement tax on banks, and banks
passed this extra cost onto borrowers by raising
the prime rate relative to market interest rates.
This increase in the cost of C&I loans relative to
commercial paper encouraged many large firms to
shift to paper as a source of finance.19 This shift
was permanent for many firms because once they
incurred the fixed costs of becoming a paper issuer,
it was cheaper to bypass bank loans whose cost
was inflated by reserve requirements.
On the liability side of bank balance sheets,
there was unusual weakness in business holdings
of demand deposits at a time when the interest
prohibition on demand deposits was at a then-
record binding level. These conditions were accom-
panied by firms’ entering repurchase agreements
(RPs) and purchasing overnight Eurodollars (Tinsley,
Garrett, and Friar 1981), likely reductions in com-
pensating balances owing to firms’ borrowing less
from banks and shifting to commercial paper
(Duca 1992b), and firms’ incurring fixed costs to
initiate cash management techniques that reduced
their need for demand deposits (Porter, Simpson,
and Mauskopf 1979).
Thus, this missing-money episode occurred
at a time when both bank assets and bank liabilities
were unusually weak. Moreover, the missing money
Figure 8
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16 Demand deposits are noninterest-bearing deposits that
are checkable.
17 Finance companies raise funds mainly by issuing com-
mercial paper.
18 By providing liquidity to firms in a pinch, such backup lines
reduce the risk to investors holding commercial paper.
19 Most commercial paper is not subject to reserve require-
ments because it mostly is held directly by firms and
households or is held by money funds.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 12
of the mid-1970s can be interpreted as having
stemmed from a decline in the competitiveness of
the banking system that resulted from an interaction
between high interest rates and bank regulations
(such as Regulation Q and reserve requirements).
In terms of the model in the first section, replace
M2 with M1A, whose opportunity cost is some
short-term T-bill rate. In reference to Figure 5, the
C&I loan shock to bank balance sheets reduced the
need of banks to issue deposits, thereby shifting
the supply of deposits curve leftward (shift 1),
and the shift away from compensating balances
and demand deposits toward RPs, Eurodollars,
and cash management can be represented by an
inward shift in the demand curve for M1A (shift 2).
As a result, the level of M1A is lower than suggested
by its opportunity cost and by nominal income.
The missing M1A and growth of money funds
in the late 1970s. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, another case of missing M1A coincided
with large inflows into nonbank types of deposits,
namely MMMFs, overnight repurchase agreements,
and overnight Eurodollars. During the late 1970s,
these new instruments grew rapidly, while demand
deposits were unusually weak (Wenninger, Radecki,
and Hammond 1981 and Dotsey, Englander, and
Partlan 1981). Owing to high nominal rates, a high
reserve requirement penalty was in effect, and
Regulation Q ceilings were binding on many smaller
banks and thrifts that were not well established
enough to issue large time deposits that were not
subject to interest rate ceilings.
On the asset side of depository balance sheets,
many firms shifted toward commercial paper. In
addition, the advent of market-rate-based money
market and small-saver certificates reduced the
funding cost advantage of banks over nonbanks.
As a result, bank auto loan rates rose toward
finance company rates, and banks lost market share
to finance companies. Once again, unusual weak-
ness in demand deposits coincided with declines
in depository assets and liabilities that can be traced
to regulatory effects. The decline in the competi-
tiveness of depositories was also accompanied by
a surge in MMMFs so large that removing MMMFs
from M2 before 1980 would have reduced M2
growth in the late 1970s by 1 to 3 percentage
points (Figure 9).
In terms of Figure 5, the reduced demand
for C&I loans (shift 1) and for demand deposits by
firms (shift 2) during this episode is similar to the
mid-1970s case of the missing money, as is the
combination of reduced demand for loans (shift 1)
and M2 deposits (shift 2) by households.
In response to this episode of missing money,
the Federal Reserve redefined the monetary aggre-
gates and expanded the definition of M2 to include
the new innovations. Before 1980, there was no
published monetary aggregate that resembled the
current definition of M2. Instead, the Federal
Reserve published several aggregates that re-
flected separations of banks from thrifts and some
aggregations of small and large time deposits. In no
case were MMMFs, RPs, and Eurodollars included
in aggregates published by the Federal Reserve
until the official redefinition of M2 in early 1980
(Simpson 1980).
The current case of missing money. The current
episode of missing M2 has been accompanied by
1. rapid inflows into bond and equity
funds that are not consistently
linked to spreads between short-
and long-term interest rates,
2. heavy corporate bond and equity
issuance,
3. edit-check reports to the Federal
Reserve Board staff of large pay-
downs of C&I loans by corporations
issuing bonds,
Figure 9
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4. Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
activity, which has reduced the
demand for M2 in unusual ways and
which has reduced both the asset
and liability sides of depository
balance sheets, and
5. the institution of new risk-based
capital standards that may have
widened the spread between the
prime and short-term interest rates.
These phenomena have arguably reduced or been
a reflection of a decline in the competitiveness of
depositories as financial intermediaries.
On the asset side of depositories, the wide
spread of prime over short-term market rates has
encouraged many firms to shift away from C&I
loans. Bond issuance has surged the past two
years, and although commercial paper has grown
less robustly, it has grown faster than bank loans.
The discrepancy between bond and paper issuance
partly reflects that corporations are refinancing
long-term debt. In addition, a reduction in the
competitiveness of prime rate financing could
affect more firms that could issue bonds than
firms that could issue commercial paper. The
reason is that only a subset of firms that can issue
bonds are well-known enough to issue commer-
cial paper, especially since the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) restricted the extent
to which money market mutual funds could pur-
chase commercial paper with ratings below A1/P1
(Crabbe and Post 1992).
Nevertheless, there has been some shift away
from bank loans to commercial paper that may
reflect the wider spread between the prime rate
and high grade commercial paper that has persisted
since year-end 1990 (Figure 10). That widening
coincided with the implementation of new and
tougher risk-based capital standards on banks that
increased the cost of C&I loans (see the box titled
“The Impact of Risk-Based Capital Standards and the
FDIC Insurance Premium Hike”). Aside from com-
mercial borrowing, a wide spread between con-
sumer loan rates and M2 deposit rates is encouraging
households to withdraw M2 funds to pay off con-
sumer loans (Feinman and Porter 1992). Neverthe-
less, for firms without access to the bond markets
and for households that cannot self-finance pur-
chases, the increased regulatory burden on banks
has likely lowered investment and consumption
spending by increasing the cost of bank financing.
On the liability side of depository balance
sheets, several unusual factors are affecting the
demand for M2. First, RTC activity has created a pre-
payment risk on M2 deposits that is not measured
by spreads between market and deposit interest
rates. As a result, these measures of M2’s oppor-
tunity cost are understating M2’s true opportunity
cost, thereby leading money demand models to
overpredict M2 growth (Duca, forthcoming). Second,
RTC resolution activity also has accelerated the
adjustment of deposits to a lower interest rate
environment by prematurely ending small time
deposit contracts. Third, RTC effects and the recent
large spread between short-term and long-term
interest rates may have induced the public to gather
information about long-term, non-M2 assets such
as bond and equity funds (Feinman and Porter
1992). Fourth, the same factors apparently led
mutual funds to increase their advertising of their
products and induced several large banks to begin
marketing bond and equity funds to their depositors
(Cope 1992). These actions may have led to a dis-
continuous portfolio reallocation by households
from M2 toward bond and equity mutual funds,
thereby causing unusual weakness in M2 as it is
currently defined.
Figure 10
The Spread Between the Prime and
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In terms of Figure 5, the shift by corporations
from C&I loans to bonds and equity finance is
similar to the shift toward commercial paper in the
mid-1970s, and substitution by households from M2
into bond and equity mutual funds is similar to the
shift toward MMMFs in the mid-1970s. Incentives
for households to reduce their assets and liabilities
also can induce similar supply and demand curve
shifts. As discussed in Feinman and Porter (1992),
wide spreads between loan and deposit rates offered
to households encourage them to reduce their
demand for M2 at given levels of income and
opportunity cost measures (shift 2), and to reduce
their demand for consumer loans, which causes
an inward shift of the bank supply of deposits
curve (shift 1).
Similar shifts can also plausibly arise from RTC
resolution activity. RTC resolutions effectively swap
Treasury debt and thrift assets for thrift deposits,
thereby shifting inward the deposit supply curve
(shift 1).
What missing money implies for monetary
policy. As stressed by Poole (1970), unusual
changes in the demand for money reduce the
ability of a monetary aggregate target to stabilize
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the conditions under which the supply and demand
for money are in equilibrium (the LM curve) and
then solving for nominal output by combining the
LM curve with the IS curve from the first section
of this article.
In terms of the money demand and money
supply curves in Figure 5, a rise in income will
shift the money demand curve (Md) out and to the
right (Figure 11a). This change implies that the
combination of opportunity cost terms and income
levels at which the demand for money equals its
supply can be depicted by the upward sloping
line in Figure 11b. Figure 11a assumes that the
opportunity cost of money increases with the short-
term market interest rate. An assumption implicit
in the upward sloping money supply curve in
Figure 11a is that the central bank will allow a
rise in income to boost money balances.
If, however, the central bank prevents the
money balances from changing, then the money
supply schedule is essentially made vertical. This
effect can be shown to make the LM curve steeper.
Figure 12a indicates that an increase in income
from Y0 to Y1 will shift the money demand curve
to the right. If the money supply curve is vertical,
the opportunity cost of money would rise to OC2,
whereas if the money supply curve had a non-
vertical upward slope, the opportunity cost of
money would rise to only OC1. Since the oppor-
tunity cost of money increases when the market
interest rate is higher, when income is Y1, the
equilibrium market interest rate that clears the
money market under a fixed-money policy is
higher (r2) than when the money supply curve
slopes upward (r1). Thus, fixing money balances
makes the LM curve steeper.
A steeper LM curve has important policy
implications. If we combine this steeper LM curve
with the IS curve from the first section of this
article, we can see that the impact of a given IS
shock on nominal output is smaller. In Figure 12b,
the economy is initially at point A with nominal
output at YA. The initial equilibrium is at point A
because point A is the only combination of nominal
output (Y ) and the market interest rate (r) at which
both goods market (IS) equilibrium and money
market (LM ) equilibrium occur. If the IS curve
shifts rightward from IS0 to IS1, then the new equi-
librium under a fixed money rule is at point C,
whereas the new equilibrium is at point B when
under the flexible money supply policy. Notice how
output is less affected by an IS shock when the
LM curve is steeper (YC is closer than YB to YA).
But if some change in the economic environ-
ment also affects the money demand curve, then
stabilizing the level of the money supply may further
destabilize nominal output. Consider the increased
popularity of bond funds, which causes the public
to demand less money at each combination of
income and opportunity cost of money. Then, as
shown in Figure 13a, the money demand curve
shifts inward. As a result, the level of nominal
income must be higher for the same initial level of
money to be held in equilibrium for a given level
Figure 13a
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of opportunity cost. This implies that both LM
curves in Figure 13b shift to the right by the same
horizontal distance and that the level of income
rises. However, if money balances are stabilized,
the money demand shock pushes the economy to
point C rather than point B. As a result, nominal
output is more affected by a money demand shock
when the LM curve is steeper (YC is further away
from YA than is YB). Because a steeper LM curve
implies that money demand shocks have a greater
destabilizing effect on output, money targeting
becomes less useful when the demand for money
is unstable.
Now consider the impact of a rise in bank
regulatory burden on both the IS and LM curves,
assuming that the Federal Reserve does stabilize
money held (in other words, that the LM curve is
steep). As demonstrated in the first section of this
article, the resulting increased cost of credit to
borrowers causes the IS curve to shift inward to
the left. In addition, as discussed earlier in this
section, the reduced competitiveness of the banking
system will likely be accompanied by an unusual
decline in the demand for money (that is, a left-
ward shift of the money demand curve) that causes
a rightward shift in the LM curve. In Figure 14, the
economy is initially at point A. If the IS shift is
large enough to outweigh the LM shift, then in-
creased regulatory burden on banks will result in
weakness in nominal income and a decline in
short-term interest rates (point B) that accompanies
both a case of missing money and a decline in the
share of credit supplied by banks. These results,
which are broadly consistent with recent events,
are also obtained if the LM curve is less steep.
Unusual shifts in either the IS or LM curves
complicate policy-making aimed at stabilizing aggre-
gate demand because policymakers readily observe
interest rates, whereas estimates of nominal GDP
are available after a lag and are subject to substan-
tial revision. In the context of Figure 14, notice how
the new level of the short-term market interest
rate understates economic weakness if it is assumed
that the IS curve did not shift. In this case, con-
sider what would happen if an analyst mistakenly
assumed that a money demand shock (an unusual
decline in money demand) caused the LM curve to
shift rightward so that the new LM curve intersected
the IS curve at point C. Based on this assumption,
one would mistakenly infer from the new interest
rate level (rC) that the economy was at point C
rather than point B and that nominal output was
YC rather than YB.
At the same time, the unusual weakness in
money balances held overstates economic weak-
ness if one assumes that a money demand shock
did not occur but that the IS curve shifted. In this
case, one would infer from the original LM curve
and a market interest rate of rC that the IS curve
shifted left to put nominal output at point D and
that income has fallen to YD, which is less than
YC.20 Thus, because changes in bank regulations
can, in principle, shift both the IS and LM curves,
they can create problems for the use of either an
interest rate or money target.
Furthermore, the dichotomy of overestimat-
ing GDP growth from an interest rate targeting
perspective and underestimating GDP growth from
a money targeting perspective from this example
may have relevance for recent events. In particular,
this dichotomy parallels the tendency of most major
economic forecasters to have overpredicted GDP
Figure 14
How a Bypassing of the Banking System Is
Problematic for Interest Rate and Money Targeting
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20 This qualitative result is also obtained if the central bank
does not rigidly target money balances, thereby making the
LM curve less steep. Quantitatively, however, the problem
of inference using a monetary targeting perspective is
smaller when the LM curve is less steep.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 17
growth during 1991–92 (in other words, they
assumed that the economy was at a point like C in
Figure 14), while M2 growth suggested that GDP
growth should have been weaker than it actually
was (point D).
Conclusion
Evidence from three cases of missing money
indicates that factors reducing the competitiveness
of banks accompanied each episode. In the two
earlier cases (1974–75, 1979–80), the interaction
between controls on deposit rates and high market
interest rates spawned innovations and reactions
that reduced M1 growth. The subsequent policy
responses of deregulating deposit rates and of pre-
venting inflation from accelerating have prevented
these types of factors from spawning further inno-
vations that destabilize money demand.
The most recent case of missing money also
reflects how regulatory and nonregulatory factors
have encouraged firms and households to bypass
banks and thrifts. On the asset side of bank balance
sheets, risk-based capital standards have raised
the cost of bank loans, which in turn has encour-
aged firms to shift away from bank finance and
some households to pay down consumer debt by
drawing down their bank deposits. On the liability
side of bank balance sheets, the steepening of the
yield curve, the depressing effects of higher FDIC
insurance premiums on deposit rates, and RTC
resolution activity have encouraged households to
shift away from bank deposits to bond (and perhaps
equity) mutual funds (Duca 1993). As a result of
these factors, both sides of bank and thrift balance
sheets have declined in unusual ways. This com-
bination of influences is suggestive of leftward
shifts in the supply and demand for money, and
thus may account for why money demand models
are overpredicting M2 growth.
The appropriate regulatory response to the
recent case of missing money is less clear-cut than
in earlier episodes. While capital standards and
increases in risk-based deposit insurance premiums
have ostensibly induced banks to widen spreads
between loan and deposit rates, they also have
the desirable effect of shifting the downside risk
of lending away from taxpayers to bank equity
holders. Determining whether risk-based capital
standards and deposit insurance premiums are
appropriate is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, this study has several implica-
tions for monetary policy. First, changes in the
competitiveness of the banking system can alter
the information content of monetary aggregates.
Second, the demand for money can be altered by
factors affecting long-term market interest rates.
As argued by Feinman and Porter (1992), both
considerations suggest that the Federal Reserve
does not have as much direct control over M2 as
previously thought, implying that the monetary
aggregates need to be interpreted in more compli-
cated ways than previously thought.
Third, by causing IS (goods market) and LM
(money market) disturbances, changes in the regula-
tory burden on banks have created problems for
both interest rate and monetary aggregate target-
ing in three recent recessions. By implication, con-
ducting a sound monetary policy is not as easy as
either hindsight or ex post monetary indicators
suggest. As a result, achieving broad economic
goals requires that a central bank exercise a good
deal of judgment and discretion in conducting its
operating procedures.
Finally, the previous and current episodes of
missing money imply that the Federal Reserve
should take an active role in policy actions that
affect the competitiveness of the banking system
and ensure that the consequences of such actions
for the implementation of monetary policy are
taken into account when formulating these policies.
For this reason, the Federal Reserve must have
significant input into the regulation of banks if it
is to fulfill its mission as a central bank.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 18
The degree to which Regulation Q put
banks and thrifts at a competitive disadvan-
tage in raising loanable funds can be gauged
by measuring the extent to which market
interest rates rose above deposit rate ceil-
ings. The measurement of Regulation Q
effects raises three issues:
1. which retail deposit rate to use,
2. whether rate ceilings for thrifts or
banks should be used, and
3. how to handle the introduction of
market-rate-based deposit instru-
ments prior to the lifting of all rate
ceilings on nontransactions deposits
in 1983.
With respect to issue 1, for two reasons
the Regulation Q variable presented here
reflects regulations affecting small time de-
posits. First, because small time deposits
serve more as savings rather than transac-
tions instruments, the small time deposits are
more sensitive to their opportunity cost than
are other types of household M2 deposits.
Second, most market-based deposit instru-
ments that were introduced in the late 1970s
were, by design, substitutes for small time
deposits.
In handling issue 2, rate ceilings on
thrifts were used because regulations tended
to favor thrifts since rate ceilings on thrift
accounts were as high as, if not higher than,
those on bank deposits. In addressing issue
3, there were two basic types of partially
regulated, deposit-type instruments that were
introduced before 1983 by law: small-saver
certificates and money market certificates.
Small-saver certificate regulations were used
in constructing a Regulation Q variable be-
Regulation Q and the Competitiveness of Banks and Thrifts
cause minimum balance requirements on
small-saver certificates ($500 to $1,000) were
much more similar to those on retail deposits
than were the requirements on money market
certificates ($10,000) over most of the late
1970s and early 1980s.
Given these considerations in dealing
with issues 1, 2, and 3, the Regulation Q
measure here is defined using spreads be-
tween market interest rates and rate ceilings
on small time deposits and/or small-saver
certificates. Between 1960 and the second
quarter of 1978, this measure (REGQ) equals
the quarterly average spread between the
three-year Treasury rate and the rate ceiling
on three-year small time deposits when the
ceiling was binding, and zero otherwise. Start-
ing in the third quarter of 1979 when small-
Figure A
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Regulation Q and the Competitiveness of Banks and Thrifts—Continued
saver certificates were created, REGQ equals
one of the following based on quarterly aver-
ages of monthly data:
a. any ceiling spread set by legislation
between market interest rates and
rates on small-saver certificates,1
b. the maximum of zero and the differ-
ence between the 21/2-year Treasury
yield (constant maturity) and any leg-
islated cap on small-saver rates,2 or
c. zero since August 1981 when rate
ceilings on small-saver certificates
were removed.
For details on deposit regulations, see Ma-
honey, White, O’Brien, and McLaughlin (1987).
As can be seen in Figure A, Regulation
Q was very binding in the 1974–75 and 1979–
80 periods when missing-money problems
were arising for M1. These disintermediation
effects were largely ended when rate ceilings
were dropped on small-saver certificates in
August 1981 and were completely eliminated
with the lifting of all ceilings on nonbusiness
deposit rates in 1983. The earlier episodes of
binding Regulation Q ceilings (the early 1960s
and again in 1967) were not accompanied by
missing-money episodes, mainly because
they were not accompanied by innovations
(such as the creation of money substitutes)
that affected the demand for money.
1 These set spreads ranged from zero to 50 basis points.
2 Between January 1980 and August 1981, ceilings on small-
saver yields were based on the 21/2-year constant maturity
Treasury yield.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 20
The Impact of Risk-Based Capital Standards
and the FDIC Insurance Premium Hike on Banks’ Costs
While U.S. commercial banks were not
subject to a minimum capital rule before
year-end 1990, they attempted to meet an
unofficial goal of maintaining a minimum
ratio of 6 percent total capital (equity plus
subordinated debt) to assets. Using that ratio
as a base, the capital standards that were
fully implemented at year-end 1992 raised
the effective minimum ratio of total capital to
loans from 6 percent to 8 percent. In light of
emerging loan quality problems in 1990, many
large banks acted as though capital stan-
dards were fully implemented at year-end
1990 to reassure market investors that the
banks could meet the final phase-in of capital
standards at year-end 1992.
The effect of new capital standards on
the marginal cost of lending roughly equals
the additional capital banks need (0.08–0.06
percent) multiplied by the extent to which the
yield on capital (ROE) exceeds that on in-
sured deposits (r d). Because most banks
cannot issue subordinated debt, assume that
capital costs roughly equal a targeted yield on
the return on equity (ROE) capital. Based on
anecdotal evidence, let’s use a target ROE
goal of 15 percent. For the yield on deposits,
let’s use 4 percent, which roughly approxi-
mates the average rate on six-month time
deposits over most of 1992. Based on these
figures, the new capital standards raised the
cost of funding C&I loans by 0.22 percent
(0.02 x 0.11). In addition, in the second half of
1990 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) announced that it would increase
the insurance premium levied on insured de-
posits by 0.075 percent, from 12 to 191/2 cents
per $100 of deposits. To remain profitable,
banks eventually would need to pass on the
extra costs of tougher capital standards and
higher insurance premiums (0.295 percent)
to their customers in the form of a wider
spread between loan and deposit rates.
How does 0.295 percent compare with
the pricing of the prime lending rate? Banks
typically set the prime rate equal to the cost of
borrowing overnight funds in the federal funds
market plus some spread to compensate them-
selves for administrative costs, default risk,
and some target return to equity holders.
Because default risk varies with the business
cycle, the spread between interest rates on
bank loans and a competing source of credit
can be used as an indicator of how competi-
tive banks are in providing C&I loans, pro-
vided that the spread moves with default risk.
One increasingly popular interest rate
spread is that between the prime rate and
commercial paper (Friedman and Kuttner
1992). Compared with the calculated impact
of both capital standards and deposit insur-
ance changes (0.295 percent), the spread
between the prime rate and the one- to two-
month prime commercial paper rate rose by a
(Continued on the next page)Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 21
The Impact of Risk-Based Capital Standards
and the FDIC Insurance Premium Hike on Banks’ Costs—Continued
somewhat higher 0.50 percent near year-end
1990, as indicated earlier in Figure 10. The
somewhat greater rise in this spread partly
reflects the requirement that many banks
have risk-based capital ratios greater than 8
percent, based on regulator assessments of
the bank’s soundness. For this reason, the
calculated effect of the new bank capital stan-
dards presented here likely understates their
average effect on banks’ cost of funding loans.
The remainder of the increase in the
spread may also reflect a slight increase in
the default risk on bank loans compared with
commercial paper. While both rates rise with
a pervasive increase in default risk, this
spread tends to widen temporarily during
recessions, perhaps because the issuers of
commercial paper generally are more estab-
lished firms and, during tough times, are less
prone to default on loans. Nevertheless, this
spread has not narrowed to prerecessionary
levels. This evidence and the fact that the
spread widened during the phasing-in of the
new bank capital standards strongly suggest
that the new bank capital standards have
raised the cost of prime-based bank loans.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
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